A Conversation Analytic Account of the Interactional Structure of “Arguments”

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Introduction

The terms I will be using more or less interchangeably are argument, dispute, and conflict talk. Arguing involves inter-activities such as making claims, disagreeing with claims, and countering disagreements. The nature of an argument has been also analyzed in the frame of disputing (Brenneis, 1988; Kotthoff, 1993) and conflict talk (Grimshaw, 1990). Argument is defined as “a conversation or discussion in which two or more people disagree, often angrily” (Oxford English Dictionary, 1999). As we see from the definition here, the terms such as “disagreement” and “agreement” are very closely related as components that shape an argument. Arguing involves the management of competing claims; the speakers must make use of the conversational resources available to them to display and manage disagreement. At a global level, arguing is highly reflective of the social structure in which it emerges. Arguing may be regarded as the major activity through which social worlds are being constructed (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1990; Grimshaw, 1990; Tannen, 1988).

In this paper, how, in the sense of conversation structure, this particular type of communication is formed, maintained, and then finally ends is the main discussion. Amongst the various disciplines of studies dealing with arguments, the literature that take the approach of conversational analysis (CA) offers a rich source of information for a comprehensive understanding of argument structure. I will review what has been suggested in the literature, together with their data-grounded illustrations. In addition to the first objective to delineate the conversational structure of argument in general, this paper addresses possible influences of culture to such a system.

Emergence of Argument

When does an argument take shape, in a way that it distinguishes itself from a mere disagreement or claim of opposition? The previous literature has demonstrated that arguments contain a minimum of three moves (Antaki, 1994; Coulter, 1990;
Muntigl & Turnbull, 1998). The third position, projected by the original speaker upon receipt of an oppositional claim from the second speaker, displays ostensibly that the participants are seeing the interaction as “argumentative”. Let us see it with an example:

Example (1) Adopted from Muntigl & Turnbull (1998: 227)
1. M: I haven’t got an objection to a ten-thirty phone and eleven-thirty
2.  come
3.   in (1.3) seems half way between your present curfew
4.  and your friends’
5.  some of your friends’ curfew.
6. C: Yeah but its still not, hhhh (.8) what I like
7. M: Well, its not exactly what we like.

The arguing exchange we see here starts in line 1, making a claim that is disputed by Speaker C in line 4. Following the disagreement in line 4, Speaker M replies back in line 5, with an oppositional claim against line 4. The poetic parallelism we find here between line 4 and line 5 [X is not what Y like(s)] is an interesting verbal resource, which enables even further the interaction to resonate the oppositions against each other’s turn.

There are some sequence types that lead more often to an argument than others. Complaints, for example, have the capacity to foster the next move to be an opposition (Atkinson & Drew, 1979; Coulter, 1990; Garcia, 1991), because the common response to a complaint is a denial. Accusation seems to work in a very similar format as well. Complainees or the accused often reply to the complaint or accusation by denying the truth value, or by claiming that if the truth value holds, they were not at fault (Coulter, 1990; Dersley & Wootton, 2000).

Either in the second position or the third position in the three turn exchange structure of argument, disagreement is the key action. The literature has delineated a variety of ways to express opposition. Some disagreement claims can be made fairly explicitly using marked aggravated forms (Kutthoff, 1993; Muntigl & Turnbull, 1998). A typical kids’ quarrel, “you did not” “did TOO” type fits into this category. There are at times partial disagreements used to claim the opposition. In Example (1) above, Speaker C used [yes, but + disagreement] pattern. Partial disagreement such as this enables the speaker to pin point the part of the counter-partner’s claim
that she/he wants to display opposition to. It also acknowledges the validity of the original speaker’s claim to a certain level. Thus partial agreement may be understood as “weak disagreement” (Kutthoff, 1993; Mori, 1999).

A stronger disagreement claim can be made by what Muntigl & Turnbull (1998) calls “Irrelevancy claim (IR),” in which the speaker denies the relevancy of the counter partner’s claim itself. See the below example:

Example (2) Adopted from Muntigl & Turnbull (1998: 229)

1. C: Yes it should be such a big deal because I’m moving in a week.
2. D: so what.

“So what.” in this example or a comment such as “you’re straying off the topic” can cast the irrelevancy value to the counter partner’s claim in a very strong way.

In addition to the disagreement moves available to the second position, the third position allows even more variety. One move which is only available to the third position is to stick to the original claim. This, given the second oppositional claim, automatically creates an opposition against the other speaker. For instance, upon receiving the irrelevancy claim by the second speaker D in Example (2), C can still insist that her moving back in a week is an important matter. Example (3) below demonstrates a case where the first speaker rejects the second speaker’s counterclaim (line 4).

Example (3) Adopted from Muntigl & Turnbull (1998:237)

1. M: We were trying to protect your reputation. We had reason
2. to believe that
3. at that time your reputation was going downhill.
4. C: My reputation is not going [downhill.
5. M: [Yeah, well that’s not
6. what we heard. We heard...

Another move, and it is the most frequent structure observed, is to counterclaim the second position. As I have discussed in Example (1), the third position directly disagrees with the second position. By taking in some of the resonating feature of the second position into the third, the original speaker can sometimes make his/her
disagreement even stronger.

**Keep it Going: Inside of an On-going Argument**

Once there is the initiation of argument, the participants in it are now to adhere to a different set of conversational mechanisms from so-called mundane friendly conversation, and such a structure drives the activity (of argument). The finding that argument requires a different conversational mechanism is more or less in agreement among the literature. However, there has been some very insightful discussion in the course of its development to reach this consensus. The main discussion concerns the notion of “preference organization” (Heritage, 1984; Levinson, 1983; Pomerantz, 1984; Sacks, [1971]1992). Sacks’ original concept of “preference” refers to the way participants construct a pattern of response activity, for example in an adjacency pair such as [invitation – acceptance / rejection], in many contexts acceptance of an invitation is seen as the first priority (Bilmes, 1993). If an acceptance is not soon forthcoming, then the participants see the response (however way it is formulated) as a rejection. In argument, whether agreement or disagreement is “preferred” against an oppositional claim has been at stake of discussion. The literature has suggested that when the participants of an argument are well aware and orient to the fact that what they are engaged in is argument, not ordinary friendly conversation, the prioritized move next to an oppositional turn is disagreement, not agreement (Bilmes, 1988; 1993; Kutthoff, 1993; Gruber, 1998). One good indicator of such a shift in preference structure from ordinary conversation to argument is the use of a “reluctance marker” (Bilmes, 1988). In an ordinary conversation, where an agreement is still the “preferred” move upon an assertion, but what the second speaker is about to do is a disagreement, the speaker may display some markings to indicate that the upcoming is not what the partner “expects.” Pomerantz (1984) lists some of the typical displays of such markings; delays, use of hedge phrases “well,” and alike. Instead of labeling these displays as the dispreference markers as Pomerantz has, Bilmes (1988) suggests they simply show “reluctance,” not necessarily associated with disagreements in every case. When in argument, on the other hand, the hedging prior to disagreements is not found very often. Kotthoff (1993) even further suggests that the opposed counterparts are expected to disagree; both speakers orient to a quick counterattack, otherwise a delay of some form, i.e., indication of “reluctance” to counter the given claim, leads the speaker to “lose” the argument, or initiates an assent (Vuchinich, 1990).
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A different contextual structural system over agreement and disagreement is also relevant, when we consider how the disputant interprets an “agreement” during the argument. When agreement is preferred, as in a friendly conversation, upgraded agreement is normally considered to be “strong agreement.” When disagreement is preferred, however, upgraded agreement should be considered to foreshadow strong disagreement (Kotthoff, 1993). An example from her work follows below:

Example (4) Adopted from Kotthoff (1993: 204)³

1. E: It’s I mean it’s all very well to protest against this and that,
2. the overcrowded seminars, the mesa, and cuts here and there.
3. M: /Well it’s/
4. E: /You can’t/ just uh protest against everything /and/
5. M: /Well it’s/
6. the fact that the university was built I believe
7. for only for thousand students, and
8. we’ve now six thousand studying here.
9. that doesn’t necessarily afford
10. another argument, but it’s a fact.

Line 1-2 is the upgraded agreement to M’s previous point. It uses the expression [it’s all very well], and the summarized formulation of the counterpart’s claim. This move, an agreement, invoked M to already engage in a defense in line 3, which informs us that she is seeing line 1-2 as some kind of indication of a counterattack. In line 4, E’s counterattack (i.e., opposition) became clear, which was also responded to by M’s further insistence of her claim. M’s orientation to the argument structure seems to attribute to the interpretation of “agreement.”

The principle of the machinery that drives the argument structure enables the participants to stay in the argumentative interaction. At the same time it comprises an inescapable “trap” for the speakers; as I discussed earlier, an absence of a counterattack will be interpreted as the speaker’s inability to do so, in other words, it leads to his/her loss in the dispute. However, not all arguments end up with a clear positioning of a winner and a loser of the ‘battle’ at each round. In many cases, an argument leads to another argument. As Vuchinich (1990) suggests, dispute sequences cannot be ‘naively’ terminated; rather, we should view a single dispute
becoming the resources for constructing the next dispute. Goodwin & Goodwin (1990) also illustrates this continuity of an argument. A dispute between two brothers, Bruce and Huey, transformed its topic to a discussion about a sling shot game. The structural continuity of a dispute that the brothers took originally in the first argument was transported to the second context. This was maintained despite the topic change, through their adherence to the sequential organization of the argument. The sequential continuity observed here is not unique to just arguments, the notion of “adjacency pair” in CA quite rightly points out to the fact that participants cannot “naively” choose to ignore the mechanism (Schegloff, 1972).

Ceasing an Argument

Termination of the argument activity is a serious matter for the participants. If not done successfully, the omnipresent sense-making mechanism as I have discussed in this paper thus far will place one of the oppositional sides as the “loser.” It is certainly a face threatening issue to the members at a more global level; the consequence of an argument will have a significant influence on the shape of the social world that they live in.

One of the most simplistic methods of termination is to voluntarily “lose” the dispute. Concession has been studied considerably in the literature (Vuchinich, 1990; Kotthoff, 1993; Dersley & Wootton, 2000; Saft, 2000b; 2001). Concession is a systematic method to open up the closing of argument. Weak agreement, such as “there may be some truth in that” “well, maybe,” in an argument framework of preference structure, often functions as an opening of a concession move (Kotthoff, 1993; Mori, 1999). More specific to Japanese language, Saft (2001) has identified the injective vocalization a:: “oh::” in Japanese, which has a pragmatic display of “change-of-state” (Heritage, 1984), often prefaces the speaker’s concession move. Once concession is offered and accepted by the other party, the social structure of an argument then has the potential to transform into something different. An argument can now shift its frame to “advice seeking – providing,” in that the winner of the argument becomes the advisor and the loser the advisee. In our daily lives, omni-relevant social roles such as student-teacher, clerk-customer are available to the members, and these roles may be used to break the argument sequence.

In his examination of argument endings in adult family dinnertime talk, Vuchinich (1990) finds that most of the episodes end with both parties continuing to hold contrary views. In these cases, the ending of an argument could be triggered by a)
an intervention of a third party (to break out the argument frame), b) change of a topic completely (“stand-offs”), and c) withdrawals, in which one of the counter partners withdraw entirely from the conversation, for instance she /he leaves the location of the dispute context.

Termination of an argument can be also guided by the third party in a more institutionalized manner. Mediation of a conflict, found in a family therapy or divorce mediation sessions has been studied in this respect (Garcia, 1991; Greatbatch & Dingwall, 1997). Institutional mediation resolves conflict by eliminating specific conflictual processes from the interaction, and such processes are the very steps which have been described in this paper. Garcia (1991) has illustrated some of the mediator’s techniques in her examination of divorce mediation hearings. She points out that the mediator’s presence in a dispute-potent interaction prevents formation of argumentative adjacent turns. Even when an accusation is projected, the participants of the session must address their talk to the mediator, not directly to the accused (829). When a statement of an accusation towards one’s spouse was addressed to the mediator, the third party to the internal conflict at stake, the accusation is also formulated rather indirectly; the accuser formulates the accused in the third person referent (e.g., “he did not do the right thing there” instead of “you did not”). Because of the pre-allocated system of the mediation, as Garcia (1991) formulates in her title, an argument may be resolved fairly quickly, as early as it even forms its shape as a dispute. When parties do engage in the shape of an argument, despite the efforts along the way to resolve it before it starts, the mediators move quickly to restore “the mediation exchange structure” by producing acknowledgements of what is being said, asking questions, initiating topic changes, and sometimes sanctioning the disputant’s conduct (826).

**Multiparty Arguments**

As discussed thus far, two-party disputes are mainly considered, and I noted that there are at least three phases for arguments. These are an antecedent of arguable event, an oppositional utterance, and then a reaction phase, in which the opposition itself is responded to by the first speaker with one of the various ways to reject the second speaker’s opposition. This structural portrayal is helpful for recognizing an argument; however, more often an argumentative interaction emerges in a multiparty context. A multi-party argument may develop its shape from an original dyadic argumentation. The process for such a development calls for some strategies on
the part of the third party to participate in the dispute. How the third party goes about doing so has been under investigation in the literature (Maynard, 1985; 1986, Goodwin & Goodwin, 1990; Saft, 2000a).

Douglas Maynard (1985; 1986) discusses the collaboration among parties to a dispute by in-depth analyses of episodes with first-grade children in an American context. Maynard has suggested that collaboration can be offered from the third party, or be solicited or invited by the already “insider” of the emerging dispute. The term “offer” is purposely chosen to emphasize here that collaboration is an achieved and not an automatic result of an “outsider” projecting his/her display to join the interaction (Maynard, 1986: 268). The “insider” parties must demonstrate either an acknowledgement or rejection of the offered collaboration. In terms of outsider’s alignment strategies, Maynard (1986) distinguishes between a) alignments against a position (taken by the first speaker) and b) alignment with a counter position (taken by the insider partner to the first speaker). See the below example, adopted from his study:

Example (5) Adopted from Maynard (1986: 265)
1. Mary: Where’s my- where is my folder:::?
2. (2.5)
3. Julie: How’m I supposed to know:::w?
4. Minda: Mary, whaddiya expect us to do. (0.4) Find every-
   thing for ya?
5. (3.5)

Upon receiving Mary’s utterance in line 1, Julie projects her oppositional response that questions Mary’s presumption that she should know the location of the folder. The first third party, Minda, in line 4 projects her alignment against Mary as well, however her opposition questions a different presumption that Mary might have, that is, that everyone surrounding her should help her find everything. In contrast, Jim in line 6, by saying a minimum agreement “Yeah.”, he displays his alignment with Minda’s opposition. Here we can label Mary’s action as alignment against a position, and Jim’s as alignment with a counter position.

Maynard also discusses the ways collaboration is sought from the insiders of the dispute, and similarly, for participation into the dispute, the third party must demonstrate his acceptance or rejection of such an invitation. In sum, collaboration
is a complex phenomenon and it is always negotiated.

Dealing with Japanese interactions, Saft (2000)’s dissertation research has some suggestions on this topic as well. His target interactional setting was a kyooju kai “faculty meeting” at a Japanese university. A meeting usually consists of multi-members, hence when an argument is initiated, it is often the case that participants of an argument are more than two members. Saft’s approach also takes the dyadic to multi-party perspective to examine the phenomenon. His observations suggest some language specific methods (or perhaps we can say “ethno-methods”) available to Japanese speakers to manage the third party collaboration. One of them is what he calls “so-method.” A third party, upon witnessing that a two-party dispute has been initiated, inserts his alignment by projecting an expression including so so so (yes yes yes). Another strategy is aizuchi (roughly translated as backchanneling), which is composed of a minimum token such as “hmm” or “un.” Not only the “insiders” of the argument, but also the outsiders also insert aizuchi into the argument, which wins them a turn opportunity for them to project their participation.

**Externally Shaped Argument: Political Debates, TV interviews**

Among the various social scenes in modern times, particularly in Western communities, political debates are one of the occasions that welcome arguments. Confictive and combative interaction between the two (or more) opponents is embraced in this particular social speech genre. What is very interesting about political debates is the unique contextual set-ups for an argument. The debaters are cast in pre-given roles to oppose each other. Another significant feature of political debates, at least in British and North American contexts, is that the debate is for an audience, both a studio and television audience. Political debates such as Presidential or Vice-Presidential debates are not exactly the same as a formal debate. It is the moderator who can only set up the topic for the debate. The speakers will address the raised topic until the moderator initiates a new topic. Some of the turns during a debate are pre-allocated and also heavily constrained by a specific time distribution. There are also a section for “free” discussion, when the speakers exchange turns in a more ‘conversational’ fashion directly to each other. Unlike the formal debate, there is no official judge to make a decision as to who wins. Instead, how much the debater can push the other to the edge and how much she/he could control the turns and ultimately manage the flow of the debate to their direction are crucial matters. The “win” or “lose” of a debate is often the indirect interpretation cast by the audience and the media.
The way participants are pre-organized in political debates and other institutionalized speech contexts also creates a difference from disputes embedded in everyday conversation. Televised political debates are particularly set up so that it invokes arguments. Typically there are two opponents, not three. The objective of the speakers in political debates as such is to diverge from each other, and furthermore, to persuade the audience of the debate that one is “better” (in multiple senses) than the other. There are certain interactional rules which the participants seem to adhere to. They in fact manage their participation using such rules as resource; Bilmes (1999) illustrates with interactional data how the debaters themselves are often very verbal and explicit about the rules, regulating and sanctioning the opponent’s offensive actions in the debate.

Because of the artificial organization cast on the participants, argument construction is accomplished a little differently from the ordinary development. First, similarly to mediation contexts, political debates are always mediated by the moderator. Except in the free discussion time, the turns from the debaters typically go through the moderator’s permission; therefore, there are fewer chances for the interactants to produce immediately the second adjacency pair. However, this does not seem to be a factor to defuse the combative nature of a debate. Unlike the mediators who use many techniques to resolve the dispute, the moderators of political debates do not engage in any of these strategies; rather, they sometimes transform the debater’s proposition into sounding as even stronger disagreement than what it was meant to be (Hutchby, 2002). Rhetorical devices for the speaker’s argumentative moves in a political debate and other argument-oriented speech settings (such as a parliament session) have been also studied in the CA oriented literature. For instance, use of questions by two vice-presidential candidates (Gore vs. Quayle in the 1992 vice-presidential debate) were analyzed in Bilmes (1999; 2001). Bilmes (1999) for example demonstrated how placement of questions by the two debaters was demarcating their (interactional) rhetorical performance⁵.

Relevance of Culture in Arguments: Cross-cultural Examination

Culture is highly relevant for understanding arguments, in fact it is inescapable. In this paper I discussed a skeleton structure of arguments. If we are to recognize such a structural mechanism, we need to know how the members of a particular culture, be it Japanese or even further, speakers of a specific community X, manifest
their “oppositional turn,” or “solicit collaborations from the third party.” How one (analyst) goes about figuring out such “ethno-methods” may vary; in many cases analyzing the interactional data themselves may be instructive enough, whereas in some cases one may need to socialize himself or herself into the practices of the target community in order to supply enough understanding.

A nice entrance to discuss culture at the level of conversational mechanism is, in my view, the principle of “priority response” suggested in Bilmes (1993). In place of Grice’s maxim in handling pragmatic implicature (1975), Bilmes proposes this principle. “If X is the first priority response, then any response other than X (including no response) implicates that X is not available or is not in effect, unless there is reason to suppose that it has been withheld.” (391). Priority response can be applied to a wider range of situations than what Grician maxim can cover; Bilmes (1993) takes the example of degree of informative-ness between “killing” versus “scaring” (392). In order to account for the implicature one reads from a situation in which one says “I will scare” someone but actually kills, Grice’s maxim must generate a rather scratchy logic to say “killing” is more informative than “scaring.” However, as Bilmes (1993) points out, killing does not necessarily entail scaring, because one can kill without scaring. If we understand this situation as “if one says Y (scaring) instead of X (killing), because X (killing) is not available,” following the suggested principle, then the implicature becomes rather logically manifested. The principle can also nicely account for more than one culture. It allows a scale to vary dynamically from a culture to another without overruling the theory itself. For instance one can see the culturally varied scale ladder of crimes, from major to minor. The principle works to bring out the implicature when the speakers have the knowledge of such a stratified order. Returning back to the discussion of argument structure, this culturally designed priority order is a highly useful concept. I will discuss the case for arguments in Japanese communication below, keeping the notion of priority response in mind.

There is a popular image of the Japanese community that they avoid overt confrontation. Indeed some anthropological literature has reported that conflict management (in the sense of defusing the conflict) is more prevalent (Lebra, 1987; Noda, 1990; Watanabe, 1993). On the other hand, other studies suggest that conflict occurs frequently in their actual daily activities. Jones (1990) considered this “myth” that Japanese culture is uniquely harmonious and that conflict is avoided rather than invoked for such a cultural ideology in her study. In her examination of naturally
occurring disputes in Japanese, she captures the speaker’s moves such as introducing a digression in topic, restating the original argument, or asking a question (seeks a repair) about a problematic part of the opponent’s talk. These moves greatly parallel the oppositional moves described in the literature for English disputes as I discussed earlier in this paper. In my view, Jones’ (1990) choice of the label to classify these moves for Japanese cases as “inexplicit” is rather problematic; it may be helpful to the readers from the Western cultural mindset; however, what is seen as analytically “inexplicit” may be in fact clearly explicit and salient displays of oppositions for the actual participants.

What are the possible culturally constructed designs that influence argument structure in Japanese? Although his data on faculty meetings more or less confirmed a general understanding of the argument structure and its genre-specific preference organization, Saft (2000a) provides us with some caveat related to a plausible cultural specificity (that is, in his case, Japanese communities) that may come into play. In some disputes in Japanese, as Saft points out, silence after the first speaker’s opposition may be a strong form of opposition in some contexts, instead of a display of the speaker’s unavailability to offer a further opposition. Silence in these contexts, then, is not an indication of assent.

In addition to silence, the act of avoidance has been also pointed out in the literature that it is not a display of assent; rather, it is one of the most forceful actions of opposition. Pharr (1990) examined a range of conflicts involving status-different parties, and has found that a pattern commonly found in conflict situations is that the one with more power uses the “avoidance” strategy. Steinhoff (1984), who studied student conflicts in Japan, also notes that the early strategy the authority takes against students’ demands is inattention. “Inattention even to a message conveyed by means of conflict implies that the respondent has sufficient power that he is free (and powerful) to ignore the demand” (186). The inattention that she notes here was understood as “avoidance” in Cook (1993). Cook claims that “avoidance” found in interaction such as argument can be the deliberate use, and the examination of data (the Diet interpellation) show that the activity of argument, keeps going.

For culturally competent speakers of Japanese, the function of silence or avoidance becomes a useful interactional resource. If I were to adopt the principle of priority response (Bilmes, 1993), there may be at some cases when silence or avoidance moves fulfill the first priority, given that one has the socially entitled authority to practice it. When silence or avoidance is not available, verbal oppositions are the
“non-X” option. What it entails is that one does not have socially proper entitlements to practice the first option, e.g., lack of status, power, and so forth. When these options are actually available, it becomes a decision-marking moment on the part of the recipient of the silence or other ways of avoidance to figure out whether it is a strong dissent, or a mere indicator for concession. Socio-contextual consideration as to where an argument is embedded would be a crucial key factor for doing so.

The social value of argument is obviously culturally flavored. Disputes are even perceived as sociable events in some cultures. Schiffrin (1984) has claimed that there is a speech activity called “sociable argument,” characterized by the presence of discursive features of an argument. Based on her interactional data amongst American-Jewish friends (including herself), she claims that some displays of cooperation (called “cooperative features”) within an argument structure enables the participants to see the dispute as a sociable activity (Schiffrin, 1984:324).

Conclusion

This paper has provided a grand tour of argument structure according to what has been suggested in the CA oriented literature. The insights to answer these questions have offered us a good realization (or a confirmation) that social order is constantly displayed through interaction (not limited to verbal interaction, to say the least), and such an order is also recursively shaped by the agents of the activity. Argument is another example of such phenomena; it is certainly a by-product of a reflexive social construction. Arguments are rarely found independently from social activities. It emerges in daily conversations. Even in some institutionalized contexts such as debates and television interviews, arguments are nonetheless invoked. Then they are developed by the cooperation of the participants of the interaction. This paper also examined a cross-cultural variabilities of arguments.

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1 “[]” bracket indicates that lines which start with it are overlapped at that point.
2 Schegloff (1988) describes this as “practice-based preference,” which alludes to the topic under discussion of this paper, that is, practice-based preference in argument.
3 I am adopting the symbols originally used in Kottoff (1993). “//” here indicates overlaps, similarly to the bracket marker ([]) in other examples in this paper.
4 This “free discussion” activity within a debate does not always entail free speech exchanges at free will. For instance, the Japanese debates seem to have certain formality (i.e., restraint) to the exchange manifestation (Inoue, 1994).
5 In the case of Japanese, Ikeda (2004) analyzed the use of reported speech in four Japanese politicians’ argumentation during TV interviews, which also demonstrated a) individual variability in using different kinds of reported speech, and b) some of the reported speech usage seems to display their awareness of the general audience of their talk (85).